Ralph Goers (Apache Log4J maintainer) said:
There are two aspects to this vulnerability.
- Log4j 2’s lookup mechanism (property resolver) was being performed on the message text being logged. This meant that if applications are
logging user input (almost everyone does) a user could cause the
Lookup mechanism to be invoked.
- Log4j 2 supports JNDI in various places, including as a lookup. JNDI itself is horribly insecure. The combined effect of these is what
makes it a critical severity issue for Log4j 2. Log4j 1, as well as
Logback, both have components that use JNDI and neither do anything to
limit the JNDI vulnerabilities. In the case of Log4j 1 it is the JMS
Appender. The exposure is smaller but it is still there. If someone
can gain access to the logging configuration they could conceivably
cause bad things to happen.
So the conclusion is that Log4J 1.x is secure and not impacted by the Log4Shell unless you use JMS appender. In that case you have to analyze what you do in the appender.