All proof assistants run the risk of implementation bugs (or even hardware bugs!) that may make the system inconsistent and allow users to prove anything. This risk can never be zero. Even if we prove the correctness of the implementation of a proof assistant, that proof also has to be proved in some other formal or informal system, subject to the same risks.
Therefore, what we should expect from a proof assistant is not infallible truth, merely strong evidence of validity. How strong that evidence is depends on our prior information about the trustworthiness of the system, and the extent to which we're able to look at a particular proof and determine whether it makes use of inconsistencies.
So, it's not a clear-cut case how strong evidence Idris proofs constitute. I would say they're quite strong in comparison to informal proofs. Also, Idris proofs don't yet scale as far as Agda or especially Coq proofs, so they are likely feasible to be checked by human inspection for "exploits".